My fields of expertise are political economy, development economics, and economic history.
I study the relations between state institutions and markets, focusing on the role of public accountability. In quasi-experimental empirical settings, I observe how the enhancement of that characteristic leads to better economic outcomes through the improved credibility of the state. In contrast, the deterioration of accountability is associated with patronage or power imbalances.
With my first paper, published on the Journal of Development Economics, I analyse the variation in the type of colonial regimes implemented by the British in Central India. Institutions meant to foster standardised practices in public administration have produced better average development outcomes than those of protectorates where the rulers’ discretionary power faced smaller obstacles.
In my job market paper, I focus on the possibility of patronage coincidentally with regional elections in Italy. To this purpose, I exploit the exogenous variation in the electoral timing caused by the 2020 pandemic. The employees discretionariliy hired by reginal offices are less likely to come from the same region right after the elections are postponed, but they are more likely when the election date is newly announced.
These contributions can be consulted in full at the links below.